University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Undergraduate Theses and Professional Papers
2016

Technology and the Impoverishment of Experience: An Insight
through Heidegger and Marcuse
Brenna C. Gradus
brenna.gradus@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/utpp
Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Gradus, Brenna C., "Technology and the Impoverishment of Experience: An Insight through Heidegger and
Marcuse" (2016). Undergraduate Theses and Professional Papers. 115.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/utpp/115

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Theses and Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Gradus 1
Brenna Gradus
22 July 2016
PHL 490 Research

Technology and the Impoverishment of Experience: An Insight through Heidegger and
Marcuse

The influence of technology in contemporary society is increasingly pervasive. While
humankind reaps the benefits of technology, these benefits do not come without costs. We see
these costs manifest themselves in phenomena such as ecological destruction, invasions of
privacy through surveillance, and the obsolescence of human labor, to name just a few.
However, despite their prevalence in the modern world, these costs often go unaddressed, if not
unarticulated.
Technology, from the Industrial Revolution to the Information Age, has reconceived
the way in which we orient ourselves in our world. In doing so it has in many cases
impoverished human experience. Communications technology deprives us of face-to-face
interactions we would have otherwise engaged in, and our instant access to the Internet, with
its wide range of amusements, has produced a culture of immediate gratification and
superficiality. Modern technology has also established a culture of hyper-efficiency in which
laborers are often overworked and taken advantage of, and contemporary weaponry is
responsible for the ever-higher amounts of carnage. With these sorts of detriments in mind,
amongst many others, how can we make sense of the toll technology takes on human
experience?
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Philosophers Martin Heidegger and Herbert Marcuse have provided us with especially
insightful considerations of the ways in which modern technology impoverishes human
existence. Furthermore, they have both posed means by which society might hope to redeem
the quality of experience that has been lost in technology’s wake. In order to illustrate this
impoverishment, I will draw from two particular philosophical works that I find address these
matters most powerfully, namely Heidegger’s 1949 lecture “The Question Concerning
Technology” and Marcuse’s 1964 book One-Dimensional Man.
Both Heidegger and Marcuse not only provide accounts of the ways in which
technology threatens human experience, but they also provide insights that allow us to
understand technology in a way that can help us to combat these threats. They both address the
pervasiveness of technology’s influence in our world and provide alternative ways of seeing
our world other than solely through the lens of the technological. Although Heidegger and
Marcuse wrote these texts in the mid-twentieth century, the insights they provide remain
pertinent in the present.
In what follows, I will first explain the ways in which Heidegger and Marcuse
understand technology as threatening human experience. I will then discuss the ways in which
they suggest we might counteract these threats before addressing the problems that exist with
these suggestions. Finally, I will provide a means by which we might reconcile the problems
that arise in these conceptions of redemption from technology’s threats.

1

Technology’s Threat to Human Experience
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There are two common views of technology that Heidegger rejects in “The Question
Concerning Technology.” These are the instrumental and anthropological views of technology.
The instrumental view, or the neutral view, simply conceives of technology as a means to any
given end. The anthropological view, on the other hand, understands technology as a human
activity. It emphasizes that the use and creation of technology is inherent to human nature.
Heidegger argues that these two conceptions of technology are intertwined. Moreover, he
suggests that these instrumental and anthropological definitions serve as the foundation for the
now prevailing conception of technology. Heidegger sees these conceptions as indisputably
correct, and therefore does not reject them on this basis. Rather, he argues that while these
views of technology are not wrong, they fail in that they do not address technology’s essence.
They address how and why we use technology, but they are lacking in that they do not address
technology’s consequences. Heidegger argues that it is in this sense that the instrumental and
anthropological views of technology leave us blind to the dangerous ways in which technology
operates. Through his “question concerning technology,” Heidegger attempts to show
technology’s essence and how it threatens experience.
Before we further attend to Heidegger’s conception of technology, it is first crucial that
we make clear his use of the term “revealing.” Heidegger refers to the Greek word aletheia in
his notion of revealing, or disclosure. In Greek mythology, aletheia, translated as “truth” in
English, or more literally as un-forgetfulness or un-concealment, reverses the oblivion that
comes to those who drink from the River Lethe.1 Here, Heidegger establishes an analogy
between alethia and coming to a proper revealing of technology. Just as the River Lethe
reverses oblivion, a proper revealing of technology reverses our oblivion to how technology

1

QCT pg. 36

Gradus 4
impoverishes experience. Heidegger refers to this kind of truth revealing as “bringing-forth,”
which exists in opposition to “challenging-forth.”2 Heidegger compares bringing-forth with
the Greek word poieisis, which means “to make,” especially in the context of art. Poieisis
serves as the root of our word “poetry.” Physis, too, is a bringing-forth in which something
arises from itself. It is understood as the highest sense of poeisis. Heidegger uses the case of a
blooming flower as an example of physis.3 However, technology does not reveal the truth
through a bringing-forth, whether through poieisis or through physis. Rather, technology
discloses the world through “challenging-forth,” or “ordering revealing.” Technology is
challenging, or ordering in that it “puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy
that can be extracted and stored as such.”4 Technology challenges nature to order itself in a
way in which it can be instrumentalized. Challenging-forth is dangerous because it understands
the world and its inhabitants as mere resources, a phenomenon Heidegger refers to as Gestell.
Gestell, translated as “enframing,” is coextensive with modern technology, the primary
character of today’s being. The enframing is dangerous in that it reveals the world as consisting
almost solely of resources. Heidegger asserts, for example, that through enframing forests are
seen as mere timber and people as a supply of patients for the healthcare industry.5 In the
twenty-first century, we can make a similar analogy. Earth’s metals are understood as raw
materials for smartphones and tablet computers, and people are often seen as resources for
social “networking.” Heidegger refers to the Earth and its inhabitants, understood in this way,
as a “standing reserve.” When something is transformed into a standing reserve it loses its
inherent value and instead its value comes to be defined by its usefulness, by its ability to serve
2
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as a means to an end, rather than as an end in itself. The enframing is able to transform the
world into a standing reserve through its subversive power, which is not understood as such.
Moreover, technology is assimilative. It assimilates everything, including the criticisms made
of it, into itself, into its enframing. Rather than showing its subversive power, enframing offers
itself as an accommodation, even as an improvement to human experience.
Technology is not value neutral for Heidegger. Heidegger explicates this point in the
following:
But we are delivered to [technology] in the worst possible way when we regard it as
something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do
homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.6
When technology is conceived as neutral, it is left to function without intervention. Since the
enframing has the potential both to convert experience into a standing reserve and to obscure
the alternative to itself, it renders technology inherently dangerous.7
As a student of Heidegger’s, Marcuse was influenced by his mentor’s conception of
technology. Marcuse’s understanding of the relationship between technology’s essence and its
application is similar to Heidegger’s in that technology in itself presents the world merely as a
resource, as a means to a end. In other words, for both Heidegger and Marcuse, it is the nature
of technology as such that gives rise to the instrumentalization of our world. Marcuse refers to
this phenomenon as the “technological a priori.”
The science of nature develops under the technological a priori which projects nature as
potential instrumentality, stuff of control and organisation. And the apprehension of

6
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nature as (hypothetical) instrumentality precedes the development of all particular
technical organization.8
Furthermore, Marcuse writes that “when technics becomes the universal form of
material production, it circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical totality—a
‘world.’”9 In other words, the technological a priori exists prior to its particular technological
manifestations. It holds nature as this potential “stuff of control and organization” even before
tangible, material technology does. To make sense of this, take any consumer product, a can of
corporate beer, for example, which requires that nature be thought of as potential “stuff of
control and organization.” The technological a priori precedes the production of this beer. It
comes into play even before we conceive of the particular technologies that allow agribusiness
to grow, harvest, ferment, package, and distribute this beer. The technological a priori provides
the context that allows us to see nature, to see wheat and barley, as this kind of “stuff” to be
controlled and organized, to be grown, harvested, etc.10
Marcuse then attempts to distinguish “pure science” from “applied science.” Pure
science is “science and scientific thought, with [its] internal truth.”11 This kind of science is
characterized primarily by scientific theory and mathematics. The laws of physics might be
thought of as pure science, for example. Applied science, on the other hand, manifests itself in
“the use and application of science in the social reality,” i.e. in technology.12 Marcuse claims
that pure science and applied science are separate from one another, and more specifically, that
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the former “retains its identity and validity apart from its utilization.”13 However, Marcuse also
suggests that applied science has instrumentalized pure science, that “science has become in
itself technological.”14 He writes, “science, by virtue of its own method and concepts, has
projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature has remained linked to
the domination of man.”15 Pure science, “by virtue of its own method,” falls under the
technological a priori and is similar to Heidegger’s enframing. Encompassed in pure science is
its predisposition to instrumentalize and dominate nature.
Marcuse claims that art has the potential to create an emancipatory, transcendent
moment in the technological world. He suggests that literature and the fine arts can provide an
opposition to the “established forms of life,” to the forms of life that have been created in
technology’s wake. He refers to this antagonistic feature of art as “artistic alienation,” which I
will address in the following section. However, Marcuse also believes that, as with the natural
world, technology tends to instrumentalize art, which weakens art’s potential oppositional
force. For Marcuse, art is inevitably mediated, and ultimately overwhelmed, by the sociohistorical world in which it exists, which in our case is the technological world, driven by
advertising and consumption16: “The absorbent power of society depletes the artistic dimension
by assimilating its antagonistic contents.”17 In other words, the advertising and consumerdriven, technological world absorbs and redirects art’s attempts to oppose and criticize it.
Accordingly, technology collapses high culture, or the arts, into lower consumer
culture. Marcuse defines high culture as that which expresses “a conscious, methodical
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alienation from the entire sphere of business and industry, and from its calculable and
profitable order.”18 Artistic mediums, such as films, books, and radio, are ideally alienated
from the lower culture of consumerism. These mediums theoretically provide an artistic space
to critique the society in which they exist. However, the fundamental themes of contemporary
films, books, radio, etc. only serve to recapitulate capitalist objects. Max Horkheimer and
Theodor W. Adorno refer to this phenomenon as the “culture industry.”19 They write that mass
cultural media such as film and radio, “no longer need to present themselves as art. The truth
that they are nothing but business is used as an ideology to legitimize the trash they
intentionally produce.”20 The culture industry has diminished the artistic space for social
criticism that artistic mediums once had. Through the collapse of high and low culture, art is
deprived of a space where it can critique the society in which it finds itself. In this sense, art is
converted into yet another resource, in this case, into advertising for the sake of profits.

2

Possibilities for Redemption

Despite their pessimistic accounts of technology, both Heidegger and Marcuse provide
ways in which we might change our relationship to technology, and thereby rehabilitate human
experience. Heidegger’s premise in “The Question Concerning Technology” is that if we can
come to a clear understanding of the nature of technology, then we might be able to come to an
insight that allows for the world to be revealed in true, non-concealing ways; we might be able
to see the world, to have it revealed to us, through bringing-forth rather than challenging-forth.

18
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However, Heidegger contends that simply recognizing the way in which technology reveals
itself through enframing is not sufficient to address the question concerning technology. He
then provides two extremes in regards to the role of human agency in understanding the
enframing. Heidegger writes, “Does [enframing] happen somewhere beyond all human doing?
No. But neither does it happen exclusively in man, or decisively through man.”21 Therefore, on
one hand, we have the notion that enframing exists outside the realm of human understanding,
of “human doing.” This is a deterministic view of technology. On the other hand we have the
idea that enframing might occur “exclusively in man, or decisively through man.” In this case,
technology is only understood through absolute human agency. Heidegger rejects both of these
extremes. Therefore his ultimate account of technology is neither deterministic nor idealistic.
He claims that while technology poses some threats that humankind does not have the ability to
combat, there are others that we do have the ability to confront.
Heidegger does not suggest that we reject technology entirely. He doesn’t call for any
reversion to pre-technological ways of life, to living off the land or hunting and gathering, for
example. Rather Heidegger suggests that we attempt to find technology’s redeeming qualities
at its core, within it, through its “saving power.” According to Heidegger, “technology harbors
in itself what we least suspect, the possible arising of the saving power,” and that the saving
power “lets man see and enter into the highest dignity of his essence.”22 As Heidegger puts it,
“This dignity lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment—and with it, from the first, the
concealment—of all coming to presence on this earth.”23 The saving power preserves the
dignity we hold as we witness truth unfold, as we watch these truths as they become
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unconcealed. There are two ways, through the saving power, that we can maintain our dignity
as we do so. These manifest themselves through the essence of technology and through art.
Through the essence of technology “[w]e look into the danger and see the growth of the saving
power.”24 Heidegger suggests that we find the saving power “here and now in the little
things”25 while simultaneously keeping the danger of technology in mind.
Here it should be noted that Heidegger’s only indication of the meaning of the “saving
power” in “The Question Concerning Technology” is in a reference to the opening lines of the
poem “Patmos” by Friedrich Hölderlin. Heidegger writes “Thus, where Enframing reigns, there
is danger in the highest sense.” He follows with this quote from “Patmos”: “But where danger
is, grows / The saving power also.” While Heidegger says that the saving power is both found
within technology and preserves our dignity, he doesn’t explicitly define it. More importantly,
he does not make clear how the saving power enables a bringing-forth revealing, and therefore
leaves it unclear as to what the relationship is between this so-called saving power and the
ability for humanity to rehabilitate experience. I will use the term “saving power” as Heidegger
does, i.e. to refer to some force that both exists within technology and preserves human dignity
in keeping watch over concealment and unconcealment.
Heidegger points towards an ambiguity in the essence of technology, in the enframing.
On the one hand, enframing manifests itself in the sense we have discussed so far; it challenges
forth in a manner of ordering and calculating. On the other hand, the enframing simultaneously
presents humanity with the notion that we hold the potential to reveal the truth about
technology through bringing-forth. Through the saving power Heidegger insinuates that we do,
in part, have the ability to combat the threats of technology. Heidegger would argue that since
24
25
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the saving power preserves our dignity in watching the concealment and unconcealment of
truth unfold, it can therefore provide us with insight into how we might combat technology’s
threats. However, Heidegger’s definition of the saving power is also insufficient in that it does
not include what such an insight might entail.
But merely acknowledging the existence of the saving power is not enough to save
experience from the impoverishment technology has pressed upon it. While we are not capable
of directly combating the threats of the enframing, Heidegger suggests that we do have the
ability to promote the bringing-forth revealing of technology through the arts. In order to make
this argument, Heidegger makes use of the Greek term technē. As indicated earlier, technē was
the proper way of revealing in Ancient Greece; it brought forth the truth rather than
challenging it forth. Heidegger asserts that technē encompassed not only the “activities and
skills of the craftsman,” but also the “arts of the mind and the fine arts.”26 Thus, technē was a
positive term. It served as a particular means of seeing the natural world through a lens other
than that which sees it as a mere supply of resources. Heidegger emphasizes that in Ancient
Greece, art did not have a distinct name, but rather was also referred to under the term technē.
Therefore, through technē, the most distinct material accomplishments of a society, via its
craftsmen, simultaneously served as a society’s most accomplished art. Here we might think of
the Parthenon or the Colosseum. These magnificent structures were celebrated for both their
material and artistic grandeur.
However, Heidegger contends that technē, understood in this way, no longer holds in
the modern world. He writes:

26
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One can object that [technē] indeed holds for Greek thought and that at best it might
apply to the techniques of the handcraftsman, but that it simply does not fit modern
machine-powered technology. And it is precisely the latter and it alone that is
the disturbing thing, that moves us to ask the question concerning technology
per se.27
Prior to “modern machine-powered technology” technē encompassed both technology and the
fine arts. However, in the wake of modern technology art has fallen out of technē, and thus
technē and technology have become synonymous in present times.28 Since technē is now
understood as both “modern machine-powered technology” and “the disturbing thing, that
moves us to ask the question concerning technology” it no longer has the potential to provide a
proper revealing of the truth about technology, for a bringing-forth of this truth. Therefore, in
modern times, art is the only remaining emancipatory kernel of technē as it was understood in
Ancient Greece. For this reason, Heidegger relies on art to provide us with a proper insight into
technology, and therefore also to present us with a means by which we can begin to restore
human experience.
Similarly, Marcuse holds that humankind might be able to redeem experience
from within that which impoverishes it. Towards the end of One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse
draws from Aristotle, arguing that if technology’s “final cause,” or purpose, were to come to
fruition, then technology “would open a universe of qualitatively different relations between
man and man, and man and nature.”29 Marcuse refers to this phenomenon as “pacified
existence,” or the “end of technology.”30 He writes that, “‘Pacification of existence’ does not
suggest an accumulation of power but rather the opposite. Peace and power, freedom and
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power...”31 It “alters the relation between technology and its primary object, Nature.”32
Marcuse therefore argues that this pacification of existence—this harmony of peace, freedom,
and power—is the “repressed final cause”33 of technology; it is its repressed ultimate end. But
what is it then that represses technology’s ultimate end of a pacified existence? Marcuse argues
that it is capitalist, consumer society that is responsible for this repression.
As Marcuse acknowledges, this is a Marxist understanding of technology.34 However,
this creates a conflict within Marcuse’s account of technology. On one hand, Marcuse’s
technological a priori holds that it is technology as such that impoverishes human experience.
On the other hand, this Marxist conception of technology provides that it is not technology as
such that oppresses human experience, but rather that it is technology under the reign of
capitalist objectives that does so. Marcuse does not reconcile this conflict. Through this
Marxist lens, we see consumer society as that which ultimately impoverishes human
experience, rather than technology. Since it is capitalism’s reign over technology that
impoverishes experience, there remains a conceptual space for an alternative to consumer
society in which technology enriches rather than impoverishes human experience.
Furthermore, this internal conflict within One-Dimensional Man also creates an
external conflict between Marcuse’s and Heidegger’s accounts of technology more generally.
Marx’s understanding of technology is much more sympathetic towards technology than
Heidegger’s conception is. Marx’s account allows for the possibility that technology can
31
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manifest itself in something other than the threatening ways it has under capitalism. Marcuse’s
technological a priori reflects a Heideggerian understanding of technology. Through both
Marcuse’s technological a priori and Heidegger’s enframing, technology, in its essence, is
understood as a threat to human experience. Under the technological a priori, “the
apprehension of nature as (hypothetical) instrumentality precedes the development of all
particular technical organization.” According to both the technological a priori and Heidegger,
technology cannot be not empirically informed. However, Marcuse strays from Heidegger’s
understanding of technology when he incorporates the notion of a “specific historical subject”
into his technological a priori. If the technological a priori inherently exists outside of and prior
to experience, then how can it include an empirically informed specific historical subject?
While attempts to reconcile these ambiguities exist outside the realm of the subject at hand,
these tensions are important to acknowledge.
Like Heidegger, Marcuse also resorts to art as a means of potential emancipation from
the threats of technology. He argues that inherent in art is a feature that preserves the
emancipatory facets of culture that act in opposition to those conventional facets that suppress
it. He refers to this feature as artistic alienation, or more specifically as “traditional images” of
artistic alienation. Marcuse writes:

What [images of artistic alienation] recall and preserve in memory pertains to the
future: images of gratification that would dissolve the society which suppresses it.35
Marcuse claims that these images are “in aesthetic incompatibility with the developing
society,” and furthermore, that “This incompatibility is the token of their truth.”36
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At the end of One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse proposes a final means by which society
might emancipate itself from technology’s threats, from that which impoverishes experience.
Here, Marcuse refers to “the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races
and other colors, the unemployed and the unemployable.”37 He argues that such outcasts have
an inherent, urgent need to bring an end to their existing conditions, and therefore are more
likely than others to act on doing so. Furthermore, he argues that their “opposition” to these
conditions cannot become absorbed by the technological system that perpetuates them.
Marcuse argues that this is because outcasts necessarily exist outside the institutions that
oppress them. He writes:

Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the
system; it is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so,
reveals it as a rigged game.38

While outcasts are inevitably affected by having been rejected from their society, they are
arguably the least influenced by the society that has rejected them. The burden societal outcasts
bear both allows them to see society more clearly and simultaneously provides them with
pressing reasons to act in opposition to it. As Adorno puts it, “The splinter in your eye is the
best magnifying glass.”39

3
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While both Heidegger and Marcuse provide us with a number of ways in which we
might save human experience from the threats of technology, neither of their accounts
ultimately prove sufficient. At this point it is helpful to imagine a spectrum on which
Heidegger exists at one of its extremes and Marx exists at the other. On Heidegger’s end we
have an understanding of technology in which technology in itself is inherently dangerous. On
the other end of this continuum we have orthodox Marxism’s technological “fetishism,” as
Marcuse would have it. At this end of the spectrum technology is understood as an
emancipatory force within capitalism in an unproblematic way. According to this view,
technology will allegedly bring an end to capitalism and its inherently destructive dynamics,
and usher in a future in which humans are virtually omnipotent.
While Marcuse’s conception of technology falls somewhere between these two
extremes, it doesn’t fall there gracefully. There is an ambiguity in Marcuse’s notion of
technology that affects our understanding of technology, and that consequently has an impact
on the ways in which we might combat technology’s threats to human experience. On one
hand, this ambiguity manifests itself in Marcuse’s use of the term “specific historical Subject.”
This term reflects Marx’s understanding of technology in that it historicizes technology’s
threats. It implies that in a different place and time technology might not threaten human
experience. On the other hand we have Marcuse’s “technological a priori,” which suggests a
more Heideggerian conception of technology.
In regards to a “specific historical Subject,” Marcuse writes that it is technology’s
“neutral character which relates objectivity to a specific historical Subject—namely to the
consciousness that prevails in the society by which and for which this neutrality is
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established.”40 Our “specific historical Subject” has been that of consumer-driven capitalism.
However, the implication of the use of the term “specific historical Subject” is that our current,
particular Subject is only one of many potential specific historical Subjects. As addressed
previously, we can conceive of technology as existing under some specific historical Subject
other than our current one, other than consumer-oriented capitalism. In other words, it isn’t
technology in itself that threatens to impoverish human experience, but rather only technology
under the reign of dangerous specific historical Subjects, e.g. contemporary capitalism. In this
sense Marcuse’s notion of technology via the specific historical Subject reflects Marx’s
conception of technology, i.e. that it isn’t technology itself that is dangerous, but rather
technology as manifested in a capitalist socio-economic world.
However, Marcuse does criticize Marxist ideology for its technological “fetishism,” and
for this reason refrains from resorting fully to this extreme. Moreover, while Marcuse’s insight
on technology is ambivalent, it appears that his ideas tend to align more often with Heidegger’s
than with Marx’s, as is evident in Marcuse’s emphasis on the “technological a priori.”
The technological a priori is inherent in Marcuse’s account of technology just as the
enframing is inherent in Heidegger’s account. Both enframing and the technological a priori
present nature as consisting entirely of resources. Recall that Marcuse describes the
technological a priori as that “which projects nature as potential instrumentality, stuff of
control and organisation.”41 But is it the technological a priori or our specific historical Subject,
viz. capitalism, which projects nature in this way? Isn’t it capitalism that requires us to see
nature as a standing reserve, as the stuff of control and organization so that it may be sold and
consumed? If it is the enframing or the technological a priori rather than the specific historical
40
41
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Subject of capitalism that presents nature in this way, then the technological a priori precedes
the specific historical Subject. If this is the case, while there may be specific historical Subjects
other than capitalism, there could be none that project nature as anything other than this “stuff
of control and organization.” Therefore both Heidegger’s account of technology and Marcuse’s
more Heideggerian tendencies are deeply troubling in that they do not provide a space for less
threatening specific historical Subjects, at least not in the context of the instrumentalization of
nature. Moreover, if we assume that, as Heidegger and in part Marcuse do, that technology’s
tendency to impoverish experience through instrumentalization is inherent to technology itself,
then how can it provide a space in which any sort of emancipatory power can exist?
Marcuse’s attempt to distinguish pure science from applied science further
demonstrates this ambiguity. As mentioned previously, Marcuse writes that pure science has
been instrumentalized by applied science, or technology, and therefore “by virtue of its own
method and concepts, has projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature
has remained linked to the domination of man.”42 Therefore “the use and application of science
in the social reality” manifests itself, again, in the instrumentalization of nature. However, just
as in the cases of the enframing and the technological a priori, Marcuse neglects the specific
historical Subject. Is it applied science that projects “a universe in which the domination of
nature has remained linked to the domination of man,” or is it “the use and application of
science in the social reality,” in our case, the specific social reality of contemporary capitalism?
Furthermore, another ambiguity arises for both Heidegger and Marcuse in their
understandings of art. Heidegger and Marcuse share the idea that art serves as a prospective
means of liberation. However, they both acknowledge that art is inevitably mediated by the
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socio-historical subject that it hypothetically holds the power to critique. While both Heidegger
and Marcuse recognize that art is mediated by its societal context, only Marcuse seems to
recognize the paradox that exists in this understanding. Heidegger, on the other hand, not only
fails to recognize this paradox, but he goes so far as to idealize it. He writes that in his ideal
society, in Ancient Greece:

The arts were not derived from the artistic. Art works were not enjoyed aesthetically.
Art was not a sector of cultural activity.43
For Heidegger it was ideal that the arts were inherent to greater Greek society; it was ideal that
there was no need for a separate cultural sector designated for the arts. Just as art was inherent
to Greek society, Heidegger argues that art, the so-called “saving power,” is also inherent to
modern machine-powered technology, that “technology harbors in itself what we least suspect,
the possible arising of the saving power.”44 But, if art exists ideally “not as a sector of cultural
activity,” but rather as inherent to the society in which it finds itself, then why should we trust
art considering it currently exists under the objectives of modern machine-powered society? As
long as art is mediated by modern technology, we should not fully depend on it to emancipate
us from technology’s threats.
It is also worth noting that the role of the craftsman is more contentious when
considered in regards to consumer-powered capitalism rather than in Ancient Greece. Is the
ideal craftsman a vendor at a local flea market? Is she an architectural consultant? Is he Steve
Jobs? Moreover, would Heidegger regard each of these people as playing equal roles in both
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the “arts of the mind and the fine arts” and “the activities and skills of the craftsman,” i.e. in
both art and technology? It is possible that the two might exist on a continuum with art at one
extreme and technology at the other. All forms of art and technology might fall somewhere on
this spectrum. It might also be possible that there is a drastic schism between the arts and the
skills of the craftsman. However, Heidegger does not provide sufficient criteria for
distinguishing between the arts and the skills of the craftsman.
Like Heidegger, Marcuse posits that “Like technology, art creates another universe of
thought and practice against and within the existing one.”45 However, Marcuse is not as
optimistic as Heidegger is about art’s potential to redeem experience from technology. In other
words, Marcuse argues that since art is inevitably mediated by the world in which it arises, its
power to serve as “the protest against that which is” 46 becomes diminished. Here, although it
might be despairing for us, I believe Marcuse is right. If we are to call on art as the “protest
against that which is,” we need to recognize that art inevitably arises from its given sociohistorical environment. Therefore, unlike Heidegger, Marcuse rightly recognizes that art’s
origins cannot be fully trusted.

4

Reconciling these Problems

Marcuse concludes One-Dimensional Man with the recognition of the emancipatory
potential that exists amongst societal outcasts. He writes, “The fact that [outcasts] start refusing
to play the game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period.”47
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However, while he acknowledges this possibility, he does not fetishize it. Marcuse continues,
admitting, “Nothing indicates that it will be a good end.”48 He then emphasizes the role chance
plays in the unfolding of “the beginning of the end of a period.” There is a risk in the attempt to
bring an end to the society in which we currently exist. On one hand, there is the possibility
that if societal outcasts start refusing to play the game, then our flawed yet ordered society
might relapse into chaos and barbarism. On the other hand, there is the hope that as the
opposition comes face-to-face with the status quo, our now one-dimensional society will be
severed into multiple dimensions. In this case, the technological world would no longer have
the power to absorb its opposition. Marcuse writes, “[T]he chance is that, in this period, the
historical extremes may meet again: the most advanced consciousness of humanity, and its
most exploited force. It is nothing but a chance.”49 The meeting of these extremes would break
open the one-dimensionality of society.
But how does this “chance” manifest itself in society over fifty years after OneDimensional Man was published? Should outcasts risk a potential relapse into barbarism in
hope of restoring a multi-dimensional society? If this is the case, then how might they go about
doing this?
Marcuse defends outsiders who dedicate themselves to the Great Refusal, to the
demand for a new and liberated society. He writes, “The critical theory of society...wants to
remain loyal to those who, without hope, have given and give their life to the Great Refusal.”50
However, Marcuse leaves us with a strange ambiguity. He claims of societal outsiders that,
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“their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not.”51 Marcuse moves past
this argument too quickly with little preface and no following explication. If the consciousness
of these “outsiders” is not revolutionary, then what is it that makes them so-called outsiders?
Here there is a distinction to be made between the material conditions of societal outcasts and
the conditions of their consciousness. The people Marcuse describes as outcasts are materially
deprived compared to the rest of society. They lack the material means to live comfortably on a
day-to-day basis, and this sets them apart from other people. With sufficient material
deprivation it is often possible for people to become aware of their subordination within
society. However, while this deprivation is a necessary condition in establishing a social
revolution, it is not a sufficient one. In order to create a true revolution, the consciousness of
those in revolt must exist outside the status quo; it cannot recapitulate capitalist norms as
Marcuse insinuates it might. Therefore there is a conceptual gap between the “opposition” of
the materially deprived and the un-oppositional nature of their consciousness. We cannot know
what fills this gap; we cannot know what transitional factors come into play in the progression
from material deprivation to revolutionary consciousness. As a result, Marcuse takes a gamble
by relying on the materially deprived to lead a revolt. Ideally their “opposition” would lead to
an enlightened consciousness, but there is no way to guarantee that this would be the case.
However, with Marcuse as its spearhead, the rising of the New Left in the sixties
proved that the transition from material deprivation to a truly oppositional consciousness can
occur. The focus of the New Left was to capacitate the oppressed, and in doing so, to act in
direct opposition to the capitalist status quo that established this oppression in the first place. In
this sense the sixties serve as evidence that while the “opposition” of societal outcasts does not
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necessarily pave the way to restore multi-dimensional society, it certainly holds the potential to
do so.
In the present day, there are a number of ways that people can and do commit
themselves to restoring a multi-dimensional society. As the Information Age progresses it
appears that societal outcasts are finding new means of expression through information
communication technology, or ICT. Through social media outlets, which are often free-ofcharge and require a computer reservation at a public library at most, outsiders can now share
information and art with a greater number of people than they could before the Digital Age.
Furthermore, doing so does no longer requires a college education, a newspaper publication, or
an art exhibition. Outcasts no longer need to depend on the system that rejects them in order to
share their ideas as widely as they now can. ICT equips outcasts with a vast, potentially
oppositional space which allows their voices to be heard more widely and quickly than ever
before. The decentralized technologies of ICT have opened the possibility for outcasts to better
organize themselves in their stand against established society. In the Digital Age, sharing art
and information only requires passion and an interest in doing so.
However, redeeming human experience from the threats of technology is an ambitious
task to pin on societal outcasts alone. Here chance comes into play once again. For one, it
might be the case that as outcasts enter into the dialogue that takes place via ICT, they also
enter into the system they hoped to oppose, and that by doing so, they lose their status as
“outsiders.” In this case the one-dimensionality of our society would remain intact and
unobstructed. Again, there is also the possibility that outcasts might employ ICT to incite
violence on a slippery slope towards fascism or barbarism. The Islamic state, for example, is
notorious for inciting violence through their pervasive social media presence. However, there
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are simultaneously an incalculable number of positive oppositional social movements that have
been enabled by ICT. Movements like Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring, and Black Lives
Matter are often noted, in part, for their origins in ICT.
Therefore while One-Dimensional Man is sometimes understood as a pessimistic
account of the potential for true revolution to take place, this is not the case. As people
insistently demand social change, they take the aforementioned chances, but by no means are
they destined to failure. With that being said, we cannot forget the consequences of mislead
social oppositions. Ultimately, any hope in redeeming experience from technology’s threats
manifests itself in the answer to the question, “Is it worth the risk?” This is a question that can
only be answered in time. As Marcuse reminds us, there are no ways to bridge the gap between
the present and its future. In this gap, oppositional forces are left solely to chance, ultimately
destined either to success or to failure.
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